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Noncash Compensation. Taxing noncash
compensation often has proven challenging for
1
the tax collector in the United States. Some
challenges, in the face of losses in court2 and
strong taxpayer opposition to current inclusion,
have led the IRS to relinquish the opportunity to
tax significant amounts of compensation income.
Government concessions allowed deferral of
ordinary compensation income and conversion of
that income into long-term capital gain for private

equity fund managers.3 Congress similarly
4
followed taxpayer victories and enacted
legislation clarifying rules for exclusion of in-kind
compensation income of meals and lodging.5 And
when the IRS began to reevaluate its historical
failure to tax noncash fringe benefits
compensation, Congress stopped it from taxing
the compensation by imposing a moratorium on
those rules and later created gross income
6
exclusions for many fringe benefits.
Failures to tax limited classes of compensation
income violate horizontal equity principles, but
issues of value and timing complicate some inkind compensation inclusions and may account
7
for historical failures to tax. The general rule of
inclusion is straightforward: “Gross income
includes all income from whatever source
8
derived,” whether received in cash or in kind. For
noncash compensation, a special rule of inclusion
clarifies the measure of the inclusion and permits
9
deferral of inclusion under limited circumstances.
No express rule exists for payments received in
services, but the principle long has been accepted
that compensation in services is includable in the
absence of an express exclusion.10
Application of the general inclusion principle
is conceptually simple. If, for example, A repairs

3
4
5

Carried interests under Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. at 838.
IRC section 119.

6

Fringe benefit regulation moratorium followed by enactment of IRC
section 132.
7
8

Rev. Proc. 93-27, supra note 3, at section 3.
IRC section 61.

9

IRC section 83. Cf. the similar rule of inclusion in the amount
realized for payments in kind under section 1001(b).
1
2

10

Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
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B’s car and B transfers a bushel of tomatoes to A in
exchange, A is taxable on the fair market value of
the tomatoes, and B is deemed to have sold the
tomatoes to A for the value of A’s services.
Similarly, if A repairs B’s car and B drafts legal
documents for A and neither charges the other, A
and B have exchanged services, and each is
taxable on the value of the services the other
performed as payment for the services rendered.
In both instances, determining the value of the
services may be difficult, but if A and B are
dealing at arm’s length, the doctrine of exchange
11
equivalency equates the values so that it is only
necessary to determine the value of A’s services or
B’s tomatoes or services, as the case may be, to be
able to tax both.
Public policy may preclude taxation when
familial or other close relationship reciprocity, for
example, is involved or the service provider also
benefits from the service performed. Accordingly,
imputed income from services generally has
12
remained free from taxation. The IRS has not
13
sought to tax housework, home repairs,
improvements, and similar services individuals
perform even when the services primarily benefit
a co-occupant or co-owner, whether or not the
service provider and the service recipient are
14
related. The IRS, however, has sought to tax
purported cash gifts a service recipient has made
to a cohabitant to whom the donor is not married
when the cohabitant has performed services
characteristic of those a participant in a marital
15
relationship customarily performs. Reciprocal
gifts support the no income tax outcome,
although reciprocal rendition of services may
become subject to a gift tax, but not in the context

of normal familial-type renditions of services,
such as grandparents caring for grandchildren
whom the grandchildren’s parents have an
obligation to care for and support.
Block Rewards. Against the backdrop of
historical failures to identify and fully tax income
from services comes the current dilemma that
cryptocurrency presents. This paper addresses
whether cryptocurrency block rewards will
become another instance in which compensation
income will escape taxation. Recently, the
government sought dismissal of a pending case,
Jarrett v. United States,16 on grounds of mootness
because the government refunded the taxpayers
their claimed overpayment amount. The
taxpayers have resisted dismissal, asserting that
the issue in the case is not moot insofar as they
continue to engage in the activity and may be
assessed tax in the future for the same reason even
though the government refunded the claimed
amount in this instance. The taxpayers claim that
17
they do not intend to negotiate the refund check.
The primary issue in the case is the correct
taxation of cryptocurrency tokens received from
the activity of maintaining the cryptocurrency
network. The tokens received for this activity are
block rewards. Under the Jarrett facts, the
taxpayers validated transactions on the network,
assembling them into blocks to add to the
blockchain, and staked part of their interest in the
tezos cryptocurrency involved under the
network’s operational rules.18
Limited guidance exists on taxation of virtual
currency a taxpayer receives as a block reward.
19
IRS Notice 2014-21, Q&A 8-11 concludes that
20
mining cryptocurrency results in ordinary
income from services equal to the FMV of the
tokens the taxpayer receives for that activity. If the

11

Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184
(Ct. Cl. 1954).
12

As has imputed income from the use of an owner-occupied
dwelling. Henry Ordower, “Income Imputation: Toward Equal
Treatment of Renters and Owners,” in Anthony C. Infanti, Controversies
in Tax Law: A Matter of Perspective (2015) (favoring taxation of imputed
income from use of an owner-occupied dwelling).
13

See Nancy C. Staudt, “Taxing Housework,” 84 Geo. L.J. 1571 (1996).

14

But see Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), in which a tenant
forfeited a lease after building a new building on the leased premises
and the court held the lessor taxable of the value of the building at lease
forfeiture. Congress later allowed similarly situated lessors to defer the
inclusion of income by adding IRC sections 109 and 1019 to the code,
excluding the value of the improvements from both the lessor’s gross
income and adjusted basis in the property.
15

Jue-Ya Yang v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-156.
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16

No. 3:21-cv-00419 (M.D. Tenn. 2021).

17

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss, Jarrett v. United States.
18

Generally Abraham Sutherland, “Cryptocurrency Economics and
the Taxation of Block Rewards,” Tax Notes Federal, Nov. 4, 2019, p. 749;
and “Cryptocurrency Economics and the Taxation of Block Rewards,
Part 2,” Tax Notes Federal, Nov. 11, 2019, p. 953.
19

2014-16 IRB 938.

20

Mining involves validating network transactions, assembling a
transaction block to add to the chain, and solving a complex
mathematical problem only possible with a substantial dedication of
computing power so that miners compete with other miners to add the
block by correctly solving the problem first.
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taxpayer is in the trade or business of mining
cryptocurrency, the income is subject to selfemployment taxes, or if received as an employee,
Social Security tax. The government has not
revised this guidance. Initially, the taxpayers in
Jarrett applied the ruling to staking and validation
(called “baking” in the tezos instance) of tezos
tokens21 before amending their return, claiming a
refund, and suing in federal district court for a
refund when the government did not grant it
within the six-month statutory time frame. After
the taxpayer filed suit for refund, the government
granted the refund and issued a refund check.
One might speculate that as a matter of strategy,
the government evaluated the hazards of
litigation and concluded that granting the refund
was preferable to the risk of losing and creating an
unfavorable precedent before the government
had completed a full analysis and issued revised
guidance on block rewards.
22
All owners of tezos tokens may perform
network maintenance and validate transactions in
proportion to their existing tezos stakes. By
staking part of their share of outstanding tokens
and performing minimal, automated services in
maintaining the tezos network by validating
transactions and creating blocks to add to the
23
tezos blockchain, each tezos validator receives
additional, new tokens from the created block as
compensation for that network maintenance
service. If tezos tokens in the aggregate had a
fixed value, the creation of new tokens not only
would dilute the percentage ownership of all
token holders, including the baker, but would
diminish the value of each historical token. The
sum of the values of old and new tokens together
would equal that fixed total value. In that
instance, the block rewards would shift
ownership and value from historical owners to
increase the ownership and value of the baker.
However, the value of the aggregate tends to be
volatile, thereby rendering it difficult to view the
dilutive effect of new tokens as necessarily
shifting value from existing token holders to the

bakers. Moreover, value dilution is not readily
observable in the recurrent process of adding
blocks to the blockchain and producing block
24
rewards. The leading commentator on this
structure has (in my view, erroneously)
analogized block rewards to self-created property
that should await sale before it becomes subject to
tax.25
This article will proceed as follows. Section I
will review the role that compensation for
services plays in maintaining horizontal equity in
the income tax system. Section II will examine
failures to tax compensation income, consider
each in the context of its potential impact on
differing groups of taxpayers, and suggest
alternative treatments for the taxpayers involved
in those failures that might better suit an equitable
tax system. Section III will evaluate block rewards
in the context of compensation income and
propose analogies more closely approximating
the characteristics of block rewards than selfcreated property. Section IV concludes that
cryptocurrency block rewards are
straightforward to value, should be includable in
income when received, and provide no
compelling justification for departure from the
horizontal equity principle of taxing all
compensation alike.
I. Compensation and Horizontal Equity
Historically, the code did not distinguish
among varieties of services to tax the
compensation from some services at lower rates
than other services, even if some services might
seem more valuable to the society than others. The
services the president of the United States renders
are taxable at the same general rate schedules
applicable to the services an assassin performs,
even though we would view the president’s
services as a positive contribution to the society
and the assassin’s most likely as a negative one. If
the president and the assassin earn equal
amounts, they will pay equal amounts of income
tax. While we accept rate differentials based on
26
income amounts generally, taxing income from

21

Tezos tokens are tez, and the validation process is referred to as
baking, with validators being bakers. Sutherland, supra note 18, at 755.

24

22

Owners of fewer than 8,000 tokens, however, may not participate in
validation. Sutherland, supra note 18, at 755.
23

Sutherland, supra note 18.
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See infra Section III.B.
Sutherland, supra note 18.
IRC section 1 (graduated tax rates).
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differing types of services differently violates the
fundamental principle of treating taxpayers alike.
Services are services, and the tax system is neutral
as to the type of services, although the form of
compensation and association with some types of
services frequently result in taxability distinctions
as we observe in the next part (for example, fringe
benefits and exclusions for meals and lodging).
Nevertheless, the principle of equal taxation
of services income long has tolerated some
differences to encourage specific activities.
Exclusion of combat zone compensation for
commissioned officers in the armed forces is an
example of the preferential tax treatment of
27
specific types of employees. Exempting foreignsource income from services for U.S. persons
working and residing outside the United States
draws a distinction based upon where services are
performed and not on the type of services.28 This
exclusion lacks firm continuing policy support
29
insofar as the foreign tax credit would prevent
the double taxation of the foreign earned income
in any event. Its original enactment may have
been designed to encourage U.S. individuals to
accept employment away from the United States
where their services were essential.30 The
exclusion of cancellation of indebtedness income
from discharge of student loan indebtedness for
workers in public-service-type activities31 was
enacted to encourage employment in needed, but
often low-wage, activities associated with public
service. Only in 2018 did the code begin to
distinguish among differing types of services in
allowing a significant deduction for qualified
business income.32
II. Failures to Protect Horizontal Equity in Taxing
Income From Services
A. The Supreme Court Gets Compensation Right
The U.S. Supreme Court correctly protected
horizontal equity in taxing services income in Old
27

IRC section 112.

28

IRC section 911.

33

Colony. The taxpayer sought to exclude from his
gross income his employer’s direct payment of his
income tax liability. The individual’s employment
contract required a payment amount net of
income tax. The taxpayer and the employer
computed the tax payable on that net payment,
and the employer paid the tax. The Court held
that the tax payment also was gross income to the
employee and additional income tax was payable
on that amount. The employer would have to pay
that additional income tax under the contract, but
that amount also would be gross income to the
employee subject to further income tax — an
iterative computation. While the outcome of the
case seems obvious today, it was certainly less so
in the 1920s.
Had the taxpayer won in Old Colony, those
individuals with the necessary bargaining power
— top executives primarily — would have
negotiated similar contracts with their employers
and paid tax only on their after-tax earnings.
Rank-and-file employees who had no such
bargaining power would pay their own taxes
from their gross wages before arriving at after-tax
income. Employers might have recognized and
seized the opportunity to reduce payroll cost by
paying all employees net of tax amounts (at a
reduced salary on which the taxes were
computed) and possibly even extending the direct
payment to include the employee’s otherwise
nondeductible housing costs, groceries, and so
forth.34 That favorable taxpayer outcome was
likely to inure primarily to the benefit of
employers, not employees, diminishing overall
payroll cost at the expense of the Treasury.
Employees not employed under those contracts
would pay tax out of their full salaries, so
employees with substantially equivalent salaries
would be subject to different effective rates of tax.
Self-employed individuals would lack a like
opportunity to diminish their tax base and taxes
payable. Eventually, self-employed individuals
would have found it necessary to interpose a
controlled entity employer — a personal service
corporation, for example — so that they might
capture a similar net of tax benefit, and Congress

29

IRC section 901.

30

Robert J. Peroni, Karen B. Brown, and J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Taxation
of International Transactions: Materials, Text, and Problems 447-450 (2021).
31

33

32

34

IRC section 108(f).
IRC section 199A.
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Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
IRC section 262.
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would have had to adjust rates to reclaim the lost
revenue and make income tax payment an
35
adjustment to gross income. In the end,
equilibrium and substantial horizontal equity
would reestablish themselves,36 but only with
added complexity as closely held employer
entities would proliferate for the otherwise selfemployed.37
B. The Tax Court Gets In-Kind Compensation
Wrong — Down the Slippery Slope
Despite neutrality in treatment of service
income, the tax law gradually drew distinctions
that favored some service providers receiving
compensation in kind over cash recipients in
violation of that fundamental principle of treating
taxpayers alike. Not so long after Old Colony,
Arthur Benaglia claimed that he should not have
to include the value of the meals and lodging he
and his family received from the Royal Hawaiian
Resort in his gross income as the government
38
claimed. Benaglia contracted with Royal
Hawaiian to serve as the resort manager and be on
call all the time. In exchange, he would receive a
cash salary, live in the hotel, and take meals for his
family and himself from the resort’s kitchens. The
Board of Tax Appeals concluded that the resort
furnished the meals and lodging in kind for its
own convenience of always having a manager on
location and available. The board made the leap to
exclusion of the meals and lodging from the
employee’s gross income.
That logical leap from employer convenience
to exclusion from the income of the employee is
difficult to follow. Gross income measures what
the taxpayer receives, not what someone else gets
from the taxpayer or what the payer relinquishes.
Admittedly, the employer gains a greater benefit

from the employee’s services than the cost of
providing salary and in-kind benefits to the
employee. But is that not always the case? An
employer would not remain in business long if the
employer lost money on each employee by paying
the employee more than the value the employee
adds. Receiving meals and lodging in kind
certainly had a value to the recipient that was
greater than zero. Undoubtedly, the employee
would have demanded a higher salary if he had
had to provide his own housing and meals.
Determining the value of the meals and lodging to
the employee might prove challenging, but it
would seem to be what tax administrators and
39
courts must do.
Two possibilities for the logic of exclusion
present themselves. One is that because it is
difficult to measure the value to the employee,
excluding the in-kind benefits from gross income
relieves the administrator or court from having to
make that determination. In Benaglia, the
government claimed the amount to be the full
retail value of the meals and lodging, an amount
that certainly overstated the value to the recipient
and may have encouraged the board to avoid the
value issue. The second possibility is that the
board wished to subsidize the hospitality
industry — a far less likely possibility, although
one that might have been in play when Congress
decided that it was pleased to exclude meals and
lodging from the gross income of employees,
codified the outcome of that and other cases in
40
1954, and laid out simple rules for taxpayers to
41
follow if they wished to secure the exclusion.
When an employer can comply with the rules,
providing the benefit makes good sense. The
employer may deduct the cost of providing the
benefit,42 even though the employee need include
nothing. The deduction might be greater if the
employee must include the benefit in income

35

IRC section 62.

36

Cf. Ronald Coase, The Cost of Accidents, for similar analysis in
allocating the loss from accidents and concluding that the allocation is a
matter of indifference as long as the rule is consistent so that everyone
may adjust their expectations and possibly insure against the risk.
37

Cf. the enactment of general income splitting through the joint
return equalizing the benefit of spousal income splitting following the
decisions in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), and Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.
101 (1930), that provided income-splitting treatment for married
individuals resident in community property states, but not noncommunity property states and leading state legislatures to enact
various community property regimes to enable their state residents to
capture the income-splitting benefit.
38

Benaglia v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
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Cf. Turner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1954-38 (in which the court
does its job of determining value to the recipient of steamship tickets by
taking the average of the amounts proposed by the taxpayer and
commissioner).
40
41
42

IRC section 119 was added by enactment of the IRC of 1954.
IRC section 119.
IRC section 162.
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because the employer’s deduction would equal
the amount of the employee’s inclusion,43 but
when balanced against the cost of determining the
value to the employee, fitting into the statutory
exclusion seems the better choice.
As slippery as the gross income exclusion
slope may be, not all in-kind compensation was
excludable. The Supreme Court required a
taxpayer to include in his income the value of a
purported gift of a Cadillac when objective indicia
44
of a gift were lacking. The Court in Duberstein left
the determination of whether something was a
gift to the trier of fact, as long as the trier of fact
weighed the facts and circumstances
appropriately. But the issue of determining value
was absent. Had the value of the Cadillac been at
issue, perhaps the trier of fact would have reached
a different conclusion.
C. IRC Section 83 and In-Kind Payments for
Services
Enactment of IRC section 83 as part of the Tax
45
Reform Act of 1969 clarified that payments for
services with property other than cash were
nevertheless includable in the recipient’s gross
income as if the recipient received the FMV of the
46
property in cash. The statute generally does not
address the difficulties of determining the FMV of
the underlying property, except regarding options
that are not subject to the inclusion rule of the
statute unless they have a readily ascertainable
47
FMV. The statute includes special valuation rules
48
for the effect of non-lapsing restrictions on value.
Taxpayers wishing to defer including
payments in kind in income must receive the
property subject to a risk of forfeiture. The value
of the property is measured and included in the
taxpayer’s income as ordinary compensation
income when the risk of forfeiture lapses, even if
the property otherwise is a capital asset and
appreciates substantially in value from the
moment of payment subject to the risk of

49

forfeiture to the moment that risk lapses.
Taxpayers may convert the future ordinary
income from property appreciation into capital
gain by electing to include the value of the
property received despite the risk of forfeiture
when the payer first transfers the property, but if
they later forfeit the property, they may not
recover the tax paid because of the election.50
The statute is of general application to all
transfers of property as compensation whether
the recipient is an employee of the payer or an
independent service provider. Taxpayers may
avoid the statute by leaving the property with the
payer, as they may with cash compensation, until
the taxpayer is ready to receive the property and
include its value in income. That compensation
deferral is customary in many industries and
appears frequently in contracts for the services of
highly compensated professional athletes and
corporate executives. The employer may not
deduct the payment until the employee includes it
as income.
A common form of this deferral technique is
51
the so-called rabbi trust whereby the payment or
property is transferred to a trust but remains
subject to the claims of the service recipient’s
creditors so that, for purposes of IRC section 83,
no transfer to the service provider takes place
until the transfer to or for the benefit of the service
provider becomes free from the creditors’ possible
claims.
Neither the risk of forfeiture rule nor the
avoidance of inclusion under IRC section 83
permits the conversion of compensation income
or the growth in the value of the transferred
property before inclusion in income to become
capital gain. Even if the service provider’s claim to
the property transfers by reason of death to
another, the income remains taxable as ordinary
income to the transferee as income in respect of a
52
decedent when the forfeiture risk lapses, or the
property becomes free from the claims of the
service recipient’s creditors.

43

IRC section 83(h).

44

Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).

45

P.L. 91-172, title III, section 321(a) (Dec. 30, 1969); 83 Stat. 588.

46

IRC section 83(a).

47

IRC section 83(e)(3).

48

IRC section 83(d)(1).
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49
50

IRC section 83(a)(1).
IRC section 83(b).

51

Ordower, “A Theorem for Compensation Deferral: Doubling Your
Blessings by Taking Your Rabbi Abroad,” 47 Tax Law. 301 (1994)
(explaining rabbi trusts).
52

IRC section 691.
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D. Fringe Benefits — From Christmas Turkeys to
Luxury Travel, On Down the Slope
Despite the general and seemingly strong
principle that income from services, whether paid
in cash or in kind, is taxable to the recipient as
ordinary income, considerable slippage in the
principle manifests itself in both decisional and
statutory law. When statutory, presumably
Congress has reflected on the matter and
considered it justifiable to provide a tax
preference to some taxpayers that is not available
to all taxpayers. Determining a compelling
rationale for the tax benefit may prove elusive, as
it inures indirectly to the service recipient and
becomes a tax subsidy to the industry in which the
service recipient participates. Air travel passes in
the airline and related industries may be a good
53
example of an industry subsidy.
Excluding meals and lodging from gross
income is an attractive, nontaxable benefit, but the
policy rationale remains elusive, although the
54
exclusion is firmly embedded in the tax law.
Those expenses, unless duplicative because one is
55
away from home on business, are personal living
and family expenses for which taxpayers are
denied a deduction.56
Despite the broad rule of inclusion in IRC
sections 61 and 83, employers frequently provide
a range of noncash, and some cash, fringe benefits
to employees that enhance the employees’ wages
but remain free from taxation. The government
has permitted taxpayers to exclude from gross
income railroad travel passes for railroad
employees and their families, Christmas turkeys,
group life insurance, discounted utility services,
57
and some cash meal allowances and even luxury
trips.58
In 1975 the IRS sought to rationalize the
taxation of a growing array of fringe benefits by
53

IRC section 132(a)(1).

54

IRC section 119 and supra Section II.B.

55

IRC section 162, Treas. reg. section 1.162-2.

56

IRC section 262.

57

These examples provided by Jay A. Soled and Kathleen DeLaney
Thomas, “Revisiting the Taxation of Fringe Benefits,” 91 Wash. L. Rev.
761, 766-768 (2016).
58

United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that a
trip to Germany was not includable to a husband who worked for the
trip provider when the trip was business, but his wife’s expenses were
includable in his income).
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requiring employees to include their values in
gross income. Rather than employers competing
to provide employees with nontaxable benefits
that would supplement the compensation
package without tax cost to the employee, as cash
compensation does, the proposed fringe benefit
59
regulations would have prevented employers
from distinguishing themselves from other
employers with nontaxable benefit packages.
Fearing voter backlash, Congress prohibited
the IRS from promulgating the regulation with a
60
series of moratoriums. Legislation providing
rules to enable employers to structure fringe
benefits that would be excludable from
employees’ gross incomes and to provide
continuing opportunities for employers to
capture employees at reduced wages by offering
benefits like employee air travel passes in the
airline and related service industries, purchase
discounts in retail industries, and various
working condition fringe benefits without tax cost
61
to employees. Universities could offer
nontaxable tuition relief for employees and their
62
families, often a sufficient reason for university
employees to stay in otherwise
undercompensated positions, relative to other
markets for the employees’ services. Nontaxable
fringe benefits enhance compensation so that
employees receiving nontaxable benefits are
treated more favorably by the tax system than
similarly situated workers who do not have access
to those benefits.

59

Prop. Treas. reg. section 1.61-16.

60

Footnote 33 in Julia Kalmus, “The Moratorium Is Over: Fringe
Benefits Under the Tax Reform Act of 1984,” 5 Pace L. Rev. 309 (1985),
identifies the moratoriums: “[t]he moratoriums were enacted in the
following statutes: (1) Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-615, section 3, 92 Stat. 3097 (1978) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
section 61 (1978)); (2) Act of October 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, section
1, 92 Stat. 996 (1978) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. section 61 (1978)),
which prohibited the Treasury from issuing, prior to 1980, final
regulations under section 61 relating to the income tax treatment of
fringe benefits; and (3) Act of December 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167,
section 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. section
61 (1979) which extended the moratorium through June, 1981).” And
footnote 34: “[u]nder the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 the Treasury
was prohibited from issuing, prior to January 1, 1984, final regulations
under section 61 relating to the income tax treatment of fringe benefits.
See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, section 801, 95
Stat. 172, 349.”
61

IRC section 132 added by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. No.
98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
62

IRC section 117(d).
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Many of the fringe benefit exclusions are
items that are difficult to value. No-cost air travel,
for example, structured consistently with the
exclusionary statute, represents an item for which
airlines generally do not set a price. Airfares tend
to vary widely as airlines increasingly use
dynamic pricing, but traveling without a
confirmed seat and being granted passage only
when space is unsold and otherwise available is a
product for which no clear price point is
available.63 Similarly, tuition benefit values are
difficult to pinpoint when universities widely
offer tuition discounts through a variety of
scholarship programs,64 and the employee’s choice
to attend the university may depend upon the
tuition remission program, absent which the
employee or eligible family member might choose
another school or no school.
E. Carried Interests and the Valuation
Conundrum
Perhaps the most controversial failure to tax
compensation paid in difficult-to-value property
is the partnership interest in profits, often referred
65
to as a carried interest. Along with deferral of
inclusion in income of the value of the interest
received, the interest in profits often enables the
recipient to convert ordinary income from
services into long-term capital gain. The issue of
interests in profits remains a matter of
controversy. Congress continues to seek a solution
to this tax planning opportunity to defer ordinary
income and convert it into long-term capital gain,
but no satisfactory solution has emerged yet. The
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act66 adjusted the conversion
opportunity by requiring the recipient of the
interest in profits to hold the interest for a threeyear period67 before the gain would become long68
term capital when the general holding period is

one year, even if the recipient made the current
inclusion election under IRC section 83(b).69
Despite the government’s concession that
interests in profits have a zero value when the
70
service provider receives them, it remains
difficult to imagine that a successful private
equity fund manager would invest their human
capital in a fund unless the interest received had
substantial value to support the investment.
Investors of capital in the fund certainly assume
that the manager’s labor will produce favorable
results for them because the manager’s services
are valuable. The investors customarily are
willing to dilute their interests by as much as 20
percent of their anticipated profit to secure those
services.71 The investors and the manager are
dealing at arm’s length so that a simple
application of the exchange equivalency doctrine
leads to a nonzero value for the services, and that
value is transferred at the outset of the
partnership project. Were a private equity fund
manager to offer to sell the interest in profits, the
sale price would be unlikely to be zero as long as
the sale of the interest would not entail
withdrawal of the manager’s continuing services.
72
In Diamond, a partnership promoter who
received an interest in the partnership’s profits for
his services sold that interest in profits shortly
following the partnership’s formation. The court
had little difficulty taxing the promoter on
ordinary income from services equal to that sale
price since the sale rendered the value of the
interest easily measurable at the moment the
promoter received it. In a later case not
accompanied by a sale of the profits interest, the
receipt of an interest in partnership profits for
services escaped taxation because the value was
73
speculative, and the court held it to be zero.
The revenue procedure74 follows the
government’s practice of determining value at an

63

Of course, but for the exclusion, airlines probably would price the
travel available for their employees.

69

64

70

65

71

Excludable under IRC section 117.

See generally, Victor Fleischer, “Two and Twenty: Taxing
Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds,” 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (2008);
Ordower, “Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity,” 46 Tax
Law. 19 (1992).

72

67

73

68

74

IRC section 1061.
IRC section 1222(3), (4).
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Rev. Proc. 93-27, supra note 3.

The profit percentage often is negotiated between the manager and
the investor so that different investors in a fund relinquish differing
percentages. Generally, Ordower, “Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design
Primer,” 7 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 323 (2008).
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P.L. 115-97 (Nov. 2, 2017).

Supra Section II.C.

Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
Campbell v. Commissioner, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
Rev. Proc. 93-27, supra note 3.
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immediate liquidation. An interest in profits has
no value if the partnership has no opportunity to
earn profits because it liquidates. As clean as
liquidation value analysis might be, one does not
form a partnership anticipating immediate
liquidation. The interest in profits under any
continuing operation valuation is not zero. I
argued earlier75 and continue to believe that
setting the value at zero for an interest in profits is
unjustifiable. Deferral and conversion make no
sense and afford selected taxpayers a significant
tax benefit. If value is speculative and
indeterminate, the transaction should remain
open so that all measurable receipts remain
ordinary compensation income until value
becomes determinable with reasonable certainty,
and the interest could then be taxed.76
Application of a liquidation value
determination produces a similarly absurd result
even if the service provider receives a capital
77
interest. Yet, taxpayers who receive capital
interests for services have no reason to dispute
that outcome. It does not alter their economic
agreement with their partners and frequently
provides capital gain treatment, rather than
ordinary income, for part of their compensation
income. If, for example, A, B, and C each
contribute $100 to begin a partnership business
and D contributes services to the partnership and
becomes an equal partner, the parties dealing at
arm’s length would expect D’s services to be equal
in value to each of the cash contributors’
contributions. A, B, and C are not paying D. D
contributes services to the partnership. Those
services add to the partnership’s capital and either
create a deferred asset, such as prepaid services,
or substitute for services for which the
partnership otherwise would pay from its, not its
partners’, assets.
Nevertheless, the IRS uses liquidation
analysis to set the value of D’s services at $75, not
$100, and treats the transaction of payment for
services as occurring outside the partnership
between the partners before formation. If A, B, or
C contributes appreciated property to the

partnership, the contributor will recognize gain as
if they had transferred a share of that property to
D in exchange for D’s services. This
characterization belies the true nature of the
transaction. It is not what the partners did, but it
generates a favorable outcome for D, so D does
not complain, and A, B, and C probably do not
report gain. The cash or property contributing
partners’ percentage interests are diluted, but not
their economic interests owing to the value D
adds.
III. Block Rewards
Jarrett raises concerns that the IRS or the
courts will permit service providers who validate
transactions and create new blocks of transactions
to add to a cryptocurrency’s blockchain to seize an
unjustified tax benefit when they receive block
rewards. That advantage could consist of
inclusion deferral — not of great concern in a lowinterest-rate environment — deferral and
conversion comparable to what private equity
managers have captured for years with carried
78
interests, or even the possibility that the deferred
income will escape taxation as it disappears into
the cryptocurrency reporting morass. The refund
to Joshua Jarrett is a single instance of allowing
otherwise taxable income to escape current
taxation and possibly convert the income to longterm capital gain or a nontaxable receipt if the
cryptocurrency declines in value. If it becomes a
general application because the emerging
cryptocurrency industry is confusing and values
uncertain, the outcome will enhance the
attractiveness of cryptocurrency, increase its
value, encourage taxpayers to use it to circumvent
current taxation, and provide a tax advantage for
the industry.
79
80
Congress and the IRS already have
expressed concerns about underreporting of
transactions in cryptocurrencies. If Congress
wishes to subsidize the industry, as it has done for

78
75

Ordower, supra note 65.

76

Id.

77

Treas. reg. section 1.721-1(b).
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IRC section 6050I (requiring reporting by payers and recipients of
cryptocurrency transactions, for example).
80

Form 1040 now includes a cryptocurrency question immediately
following the taxpayer information.
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81

other industries, that decision should have to
work its way through the legislative process and
aspire to becoming a principled decision. It would
be unfortunate if the IRS and courts again create
an unintended tax subsidy for an industry, as they
82
did with carried interests.
A. Some Perspectives on Cryptocurrency
Cryptocurrency is intangible property and,
like most other intangible property, has no
intrinsic value. It differs from much other
intangible property in that its value is not
referential; that is, it fluctuates in value
83
independently of the value of other property.
Cryptocurrency value instead depends on a
public perception that it has value that the holder
may exchange for money, services, tangible
property, or other intangible property. That same
observation could be made about much other
property having no intrinsic value, for example,
limited issue trading cards that have a physical
84
manifestation of trivial value — cardstock.
That the nature of the property or value is
amorphous should not alter the tax outcome.
Many financial products are amorphous,85 but
that does not prevent their taxation. If nothing
more, cryptocurrencies are multiparty contractual
relationships under which the holders of the
cryptocurrency abide by a series of network rules.
Those rules embedded in the network’s computer
code support a blockchain network. The network
consists of individual computers that interconnect
by running a computer program specific to the
cryptocurrency.
Maintenance of the network involves
memorializing a growing historical record of
transactions in unalterable, interlinking blocks.
The cryptocurrency record must exist in multiple
identical, valid copies called a distributed ledger.
81

Supra Section II.D for fringe benefits and percentage depletion for
mineral production, for examples.
82

Supra Section II.E.

83

Corporate shares, for example, are intangible property that refer to
the value and represent ownership in a corporation; futures and forward
contracts settle in cash but fluctuate in value relative to a referent item —
a commodity or a foreign currency, for example.
84

The distributed ledger ensures the accuracy of the
historical record, and that record reliability
enables the cryptocurrency holder to exchange
the cryptocurrency digital tokens for something
else securely. This duplication of the ledger
renders the historical record substantially
immutable. Tampering with the record, while not
impossible, is far more difficult than tampering
with a central record common to the
recordkeeping of most financial institutions and
records because it would be necessary to alter the
record in many locations simultaneously without
disconnecting the altered record block from the
blockchain. Cryptography underlying the
distributed ledger poses a formidable barrier to
manipulation of or interference with the ledger
blocks.
Division of a cryptocurrency into convenient
units having no physical manifestation is simply a
convenience. The units or tokens represent a
fluctuating fractional share of the network and
access to the network. The total number of
fractional shares is not fixed but grows under
well-defined network rules. Those rules serve to
maintain and increase the value of each token
consistent with market demand for the tokens and
in harmony with the public perception that they
have value. Unlike self-created property, rules
built into the network code prevent anyone from
adding tokens or destroying tokens except as
permitted or required by the network software
under transparent rules known to all token
owners. In this respect, baking (tez) and mining
(bitcoin) are unlike self-creating property or
extracting minerals from property the extractor
owns unconstrained by external limitations on the
process. Rather, block rewards are simply
payment for services rendered in maintaining the
network. Whether the payment amount is a
correct measure of the underlying value of the
services is of minor consequence but could lead to
a limitation on deduction of the payment if the
86
amount were not reasonable compensation.
Creators of property, including farmers
growing crops or raising livestock, are not limited
by external rules embedded into the property
itself. There may be physical limitations, such as

Their value is somewhat dependent on their physical condition, but
physical condition of sports memorabilia already is diminishing as a
factor for some collectors as they transition to sports non-fungible tokens
for their memorabilia.
85

Weather derivatives, for example.
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space to raise crops, or market limitations that
prevent manufacturers from creating products for
which there is insufficient demand, but there are
no limitations defined by the consent of all
participants in the property itself that enable the
property to exist as there are with cryptocurrency.
What resembles self-created property in the
cryptocurrency world is that someone does
something to create new tokens. There the
resemblance ends. The act of creation of tokens is
essentially a ministerial task under well-defined
network rules designating who gets to produce
87
tokens, when, and how many. A better analogy
than self-created property might be that of a
securities dealer who places all or part of an
offering of securities and receives a percentage of
the value as a fee for those services — ordinary
compensation income — although the network
maintenance function for proof of stake
cryptocurrencies may be far more routine and
ministerial.
Finiteness of cryptocurrency tokens is
essential to value. Unlimited issuance of tokens,
just as unlimited issuance of fiat currencies,
would cause them to lose their value quickly as
the value of the token dilutes. The limited
quantity of any item, tangible or intangible (gold,
diamonds, corporate shares, pink pineapples, and
so forth), when accompanied by demand for the
item, gives the item a market value. If there is
demand for an item and the item is or becomes
scarce, its value increases. An artwork frequently
increases materially in value when the creator
dies because there will be no more artwork from
that artist. Unique items frequently command
high market values. In the world of distributed
ledger technology, that also underlies
cryptocurrency — non-fungible tokens have
value because of their uniqueness. While it may
be correct to observe that shutting all computers
off that are running the software for a
88
cryptocurrency would eliminate its value, the
observation would not seem to add to any tax
analysis. The owners of tokens of the
cryptocurrency cannot and will not allow the

network to fail, lest they destroy their own
investment.
Cryptocurrencies are investment products
that fluctuate in value. In that, they are no
different from precious gems or collectibles,
except their storage medium is the cloud rather
than a physical location and they may be
exchanged more rapidly than other items as a
function of computing speed. They have not
replaced national currencies maintained through
centralized ledgers to become a routine means of
exchange. Several countries have experimented
with their own cryptocurrencies that would be
designed to have a stable value as the fiat currency
of the country has. Only El Salvador has adopted
an existing cryptocurrency, bitcoin, as a national
currency. Bitcoin’s volatility renders it of limited
use as a regular means of exchange, although
countries with hyperinflationary national
currencies have had to depend on an alternative
currency, the U.S. dollar, for example, for
international and some domestic trade because of
the national currency’s volatility. Volatility of
domestic currency value is part of everyday life,
and residents of those countries try to work
around that volatility.
A cryptocurrency token is an arbitrary
recordkeeping unit built into the ledger; an
artifice just as national currencies are customary
units of exchange in the country in which they are
in use. They have no immutable characteristics
89
that determine their size and value. The United
States, Canada, Zimbabwe, and Hong Kong all
name their currencies dollars, but they differ in
value per unit. None of the currencies are backed
by anything physical, like gold. Each is backed
only by the consent of the national government
that it may be used as legal tender and, generally,
the full faith and credit of the issuing nation.
While a national currency is a means of lawful
exchange, that designation does not peg specific
purchasing power to the dollar.
If the United States replaced existing dollars
with new dollars in a 5 to 1 or 1 to 5 ratio, the value
of each new dollar would remain a function of the
U.S. dollar concept and a fractional share of all
dollars outstanding. Purchasing power of the new

87

Sutherland, supra note 18, at Section V.E. Crop shares are no
different.
88

Sutherland, supra note 18, at 962.
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dollar is likely to approximate one-fifth or five
times the purchasing power of the old dollar,
depending on the ratio of exchange as 5 to 1 or 1
to 5. The blockchain for each cryptocurrency
accommodates and records transfer of fractional
shares of a token in the blockchain without
permitting the holders to alter or redefine the
tokens themselves. Only the network may change
the number of tokens outstanding, either
automatically as built into the network program
or with the consent of token holders, as limited or
permitted by the computer code rules controlling
the cryptocurrency.
B. Taxing Block Rewards: No Economic Dilution
On the simplest level, block rewards increase
the number of tokens the recipient of a block
reward owns and concomitantly the recipient’s
proportional share of that cryptocurrency. If
tokens of a cryptocurrency do not decline in value
because additional tokens are issued — that is, the
value of each token is unaffected by the issuance
of more tokens — the IRS’s approach to taxing
90
block rewards makes good sense. New tokens a
baker (tez) or miner (bitcoin) produces and retains
in the validation process through which
transactions are grouped into blocks and added to
the cryptocurrency’s blockchain are
compensation for services paid by the network
under its operational rules. The new tokens are
currently taxable and, so long as the network
continues to operate, the tokens are traded and
have an ascertainable, but often rapidly
91
fluctuating, FMV.
For successful cryptocurrencies, there is no
determinable dilution in value, as opposed to
percentage ownership, of one stakeholder’s
interest in a cryptocurrency upon issuance of a
92
block reward to another stakeholder. That
outcome seems reasonable insofar as the
cryptocurrency baker or miner adds value to the

whole by performing the network maintenance
functions. Each owner’s tokens do not change
value, other than by reason of market fluctuation
common to all investment assets. It is difficult to
ascertain with certainty whether outstanding
tokens would increase in value more if no
additional tokens were issued as block rewards;
although, each token holder might have to pay a
network maintenance fee directly rather than
through the block reward system. It is equally
unknowable whether an increase in value of
outstanding tokens might flow from the
increasing supply evidencing a well-functioning
network.93 However, the carefully controlled
growth in outstanding tokens through network
maintenance block rewards suggests that block
rewards are at least matched by value added
through the performance of network maintenance
services. Temporary restrictions on the transfer of
new or old tokens of the recipient may constitute
a risk of forfeiture deferring the miner’s or baker’s
inclusion in income until the restrictions lapse but
are more likely to constitute temporary
restrictions that the taxing statute disregards in
94
determining the value to include in income.
As with cryptocurrencies, corporations
commonly pay employees with their own newly
issued shares. The issuance of additional shares
generally does not affect the value of outstanding
shares. The relative corporate ownership of each
shareholder is diluted by issuance of new shares,
but concomitantly with the issuance of
compensatory shares, the corporation
presumably increases in value because the
employee’s efforts add value. The added value
offsets or exceeds any economic dilution that
95
might accompany the ownership dilution, so
shares retain their value because it is in part a
function of the value of the corporation. If the
employee had been paid in cash, the employee’s
efforts similarly would have increased the value

93

90

Notice 2014-16, supra note 19.

91

Initially, the Jarretts acknowledged the ascertainable FMV and
reported the block rewards as ordinary compensation income before
amending their return.
92

With proof of stake cryptocurrencies, the baker or validator may
not engage in validation and may not receive additional tokens for
validating unless the validator owns a position in the cryptocurrency. A
miner or validator in proof of work cryptocurrencies need not own a
position before receiving new tokens and gaining a position.
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See, however, the analysis of dilution in proof of stake rewards in
Mattia Landoni and Sutherland, “Dilution and True Economic Gain
From Cryptocurrency Block Rewards,” Tax Notes Federal, Aug. 17, 2020,
p. 1213. The analysis concludes that determining the economic effect of
dilution by block rewarding is uncertain.
94

IRC section 83(c).

95

Not a simple application of exchange equivalency, supra note 11
and accompanying text, because in an employer-employee context, the
value added by the employee’s services should exceed the amount the
employee is paid for them.
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of the corporation, but that increase would have
been offset, at least in part, by the cash payment.96
A cryptocurrency network is not a
corporation, of course, but the resemblance is
clear. A partnership analysis also recommends
itself, but as noted above, the government has not
done a good job with partnership interests as
97
payment for services. Nevertheless, the analogy
holds with the issuance or increase in a service
partner’s proportional interest in the partnership.
Value the partner adds generates an increase in
the partnership’s assets or decrease in the
partnership’s expenditures that offsets or exceeds
the value of the compensatory additional interest,
but not the percentage ownership in the
partnership.98
On the deduction side, the inclusion in the
baker’s or miner’s income99 yields a deduction or
100
capital expenditure on the payer’s side. In the
case of a corporation, payment with shares gives
the corporate payer the deduction or capital
expenditure. A partnership, as an entity, should
get the deduction or capital expenditure, and the
partners and the partnership would allocate the
deduction or capital expenditure among all the
101
partners, including the service partner.
It is unnecessary to ascertain the nature of the
payer since many transactions involve inclusion
in income to a service provider without an
accompanying deduction, for example,
housekeeping services in one’s residence.
Cryptocurrency networks provide a less certain
answer to the deduction question because they
are not obviously entities. Cryptocurrencies seem
to be a common enterprise for profit analogous to
a pool of capital, usually a partnership or limited
liability company, but are lacking a centrally
managed capital sum that is characteristic of the

96

Contrast stock dividends that dilute value, not just ownership
percentage — although public perception about corporate value when
the corporation pays a stock dividend and price decreases, increasing
demand under a supply-demand analysis, may counteract the full
potential effect of dilution.

capital pool, so the partnership comparison may
fall short. The deduction ought to belong to all
owners of the cryptocurrency since they are coowners in the enterprise represented by the
network, perhaps most analogous to a tenancy in
common. Unfortunately for most owners whose
proportional interests in the cryptocurrency
outstanding diminish from the issuance of new
tokens, the deduction would be related to
102
maintenance of their investment, a
miscellaneous itemized deduction for
individuals, giving rise to no tax benefit under
103
rules currently in effect. Capitalization to the
owner’s cryptocurrency position for expenditures
maintaining the network may be a supportable
outcome, but network maintenance is recurrent
and ongoing, making it seem more like a current
expenditure, hence not capitalizable.
Whether the network rules allocate additional
tokens to a baker or miner for their activity in
baking or mining or cancel tokens of token
holders who do not engage in baking or mining
should be a matter of indifference.104 The effect is
reallocation of ownership of the network as
compensation for the activity of the miner or
baker, increasing the miner’s or baker’s
proportional network share. The value
transferred to the validators has the same effect as
the issuance of new tokens as described in the
preceding paragraphs, but shrinking the number
of outstanding tokens might send the wrong
public message and suggest a loss in the
aggregate value of the cryptocurrency.
Staking complicates and obfuscates the simple
characterization of tokens for services as
compensation income but should not alter the
compensation outcome. If, contrary to the actual
operation of the tezos network, each token holder
periodically must relinquish tokens to maintain
the network so that the relinquished tokens
transfer to the bakers, each token holder is
deemed to have sold those tokens for their FMVs,
a taxable event yielding capital gain or loss

97

Supra Section II.E.

98

Supra text following note 78.

99

IRC section 83(a).

100

IRC section 83(h). See supra Section II.C.

101

Subject to the limitation on shifting of cash-basis items if the
service partner had no partnership interest before the receipt of the
interest. IRC section 706(d).
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IRC section 67(g).
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See Sutherland, supra note 18. Cf. IRC section 305(c) for treatment
of alterations to outstanding shares that have the effect of an increase to
one shareholder and decrease of proportional ownership to another.
And see the discussion of the purchasing power of a new dollar, supra,
text following note 90.
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105

because the tokens are capital assets. That FMV
is a payment made for the baker’s services,
deductible or capitalizable under the applicable
106
rule for in-kind payments for services.
The value of the tokens received for baking or
validation services is neither unknown nor
ambiguous. Tokens have an ascertainable FMV
when the baker receives them. Inclusion in
income is immediate and measurable. That a
baker participates in many transactions during
the year is hardly a sufficient reason not to include
the compensation income as ordinary income,
even if inconvenient to track. Nor is volatility of
the property reason to exclude the compensation
income when received. Absent a contractual risk
of forfeiture,107 the operative statute governing
compensation paid with property other than cash
108
contains no exception for volatile property. Postreceipt fluctuations in value yield realized gain or
loss when the baker sells or exchanges the tokens
109
received as compensation.

I do not believe the industry to be essential but
rather view it as generating an investment
product with some limited practical applications.
Nevertheless, cryptocurrency proponents might
persuade Congress to subsidize the industry with
favorable tax treatment consistent with
Congress’s abandonment of horizontal equity
principles in the enactment of the qualified
110
business income deduction. That deduction
favors sole proprietorship income over income
from the performance of services as an employee
and further favors income from businesses that
generate income only indirectly based on the
reputation or skill of the owners over income from
those directly based on the reputation of skill of
111
the owners. 


IV. Conclusion
The Jarrett litigation, however, threatens to
create a new compensation income tax benefit
administratively or judicially without a sound
foundation for violating horizontal equity
principles. Block rewards are compensation for
network maintenance services and taxable
immediately. Given the ongoing trading in each
cryptocurrency’s tokens, there is no uncertainty as
to the value of the rewards when received. If the
inconvenience of reporting the income suggests
that immediate inclusion in income undermines
the growth of an important and essential new
technology industry, the remedy ought to be with
Congress.
105

Cf. the discussion of partnership capital interests for services, supra
Section II.E, where mischaracterization of the transaction as among the
existing partners and service partner, rather than the partnership and the
service partner, results in the non-service partners recognizing gain on
the transfer of a portion of the property, which they otherwise contribute
to the partnership, to the service partner.
106
107
108

IRC section 83(h).
Id.
IRC section 83(a).

109

Characterizing staking as analogous to gambling does little to
change the outcome. Tokens exchanged for participation in a wager have
been sold at their FMV, yielding capital gain or loss. Gambling gains are
ordinary income if the staker ends up with more tokens of greater
aggregate value, while gambling losses are deductible only to the extent
of gambling gains. IRC section 165(d).
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IRC section 199A.

111

IRC section 199A(d)(1).
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